INTRODUCTION
Conventional theory suggests that when policy makers set out to determine the level of commodity taxes, many factors influence their decision. One factor is the impact that these taxes will have on demand behavior. Additionally, policy makers' decisions are influenced by the amount of excess burden or deadweight loss created by the tax, along with the amount of tax revenue that will be generated by these taxes.
What this paper will examine is the extent, if any, to which policy makers' decisions concerning commodity tax rates are influenced by non-revenue maximizing influences. Namely, the focus of this paper is to examine the impact that non-revenue maximizing influences can have on state level cigarette tax setting behavior.
Organizations dedicated to reducing tobacco consumption see increased tax rates on tobacco products as one way of achieving their goal. This paper explores the impact that such organizations can have on tax setting behavior.
Policy makers are always keenly aware of the impact that commodity taxes have on demand behavior. Commodity taxes are often used to adjust output levels to achieve some socially optimal level of output in the face of externalities. 1 We most commonly refer to these taxes as Pigouvian taxes. Much work has gone into deriving the equations that identify what the optimal tax rate should be.
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This paper adds to the literature in that
it examines to what extent, if any, these tax rates are adjusted to reflect the influence of interest groups that are not concerned with revenue issues but with consumption levels.
In Equation (1), we model commodity taxes as a function of the policy maker's desire to minimize excess burden, maximize revenue, and take into account non-revenue maximizing influences.
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It is the impact of these non-revenue influences on tax rates that we explore in this paper.
Where t is the commodity tax rate, TR is tax revenue, DWL is the excess burden of the commodity tax, NR is the non revenue considerations that affect the tax rate.
Namely, this paper will examine the influence that two programs had on state level cigarette tax rates during the period of 1980 through 1997. We examine the influence, if any, that the amount of state level giving, in the form of private donations, to the American Cancer Society (ACS) had on cigarette tax rates over the sample period.
We also examine the relationship between the cigarette tax rates of those states that participated in a joint program to reduce tobacco consumption and those states that did not. The program was sponsored by the National Cancer Institute and ACS and was
called The American Stop Smoking Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention (ASSIST).
One of the ways that the participants in ASSIST expected to reduce tobacco consumption was to aggressively endorse efforts that would lead to higher tobacco tax rates, thereby reducing demand. Our paper examines the effectiveness of this program in its pursuit to raise tobacco tax rates. Holcombe (1997) examines the extent of effort and costs that special interests are willing to expend in support of or opposition to cigarette tax changes. The author estimates that 25 percent of the revenue raised from the tax, after 3 For a more through analysis of the determinants of cigarette tax rates, see Cameron (1989) .
factoring in administrative costs, is used by both sides in these pursuits. This is a substantial amount of resources dedicated to influencing tax rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section further explains the ASSIST program and outlines the time frame over which the program was in operation as well as its goals. Section 2 elaborates on the data used and its sources. In Section 3 we discuss the results of empirical testing. Concluding remarks and areas for future research are presented in Section 4.
Project ASSIST
In October of 1991 the planning phase of a collaborative effort between the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the American Cancer Society (ACS) began in 17
states across the United States. Individual public health departments in each state submitted proposals through a competitive bidding process to the NCI to secure funds for programs aimed at establishing grass roots and policy based programs to discourage the use of tobacco products in their state. The programs design was to alter the social-political environment through policy-based approaches that might lead to prevention or reduction in tobacco use (Stillman et al. 1999 ).
The sums of money dedicated to the program were non-trivial. The NCI proposed total awards of over $136.5 million to ASSIST states, with the ACS supporting those efforts by matching 15% in each state. The ACS, in addition, provided resources such as staff, volunteer help, and in-kind contributions (Stillman et al. 1999) . Resources would need to be large, because in all, there were 91 million people in ASSIST states.
Holcombe (1997) notes that selective excise taxes cause greater expenditures of political costs if the tax is not optimally placed on the correct amount of people. He writes (pg. 95) " The key conclusion … is that the political costs associated with lobbying to avoid selective excise taxation are maximized when the selective excise tax covers half the population."
Although each individual state would design a plan that was unique to their population, there were some common threads that were the focus of their efforts to affect the use of tobacco products. Those intervention plans included but were not limited to 1) developing media advocacy skills and increasing media coverage of tobacco issues; 2) strengthening local and state level indoor clean air laws and reducing tobacco advertising and promotion; and 3) increasing taxes on tobacco products (Stillman et al. 1999 ).
Research has shown that tobacco demand and consumption generally fall (but not by great amounts) when excise taxes rise. See Wasserman et al. (1991) 
THE DATA
In this section we discuss the data used in this examination. We also provide information on the sources used to gather the data and a brief economic rationale for including these data in the paper.
The time span of this investigation is from 1980 to 1997. Our cross-sectional time-series data has information for all fifty states over this period. Descriptive statistics on the data set are presented in Table 1 .
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One of the unique features of this research is the information that we were able to obtain from the ACS on per capita giving by state to this organization. Unfortunately, this data was only available up to 1997, which somewhat limited our analysis.
We create a variable that serves as a proxy for voter conservatism. The American Conservative Union (ACU) is a private partisan organization that creates a yearly rating of all members of Congress. This measure is created by observing the voting records of each member of Congress on twenty key issues. These issues include foreign and social policy, along with budgetary concerns. Voting positively or negatively on a particular issue that is deemed to be 'conservative' is rewarded with 5 points. Therefore, a perfect conservative score would be 100 points for any given year. We take the average of all congresspersons for a state to create an ACU score for each state over the sample period.
We would expect that those states with higher ACU scores would have lower tax rates.
We also have data on the percentage of a state's population residing in a metropolitan area. The data also includes information on the representation of four different age cohorts living in the state. The age cohorts presented are ages 18 to 24, ages 25 to 44, ages 45 to 64, and persons 65 years old and older. To have data that was consistent throughout the entire time span under investigation, we separated the data into the cohorts presented. Given changing preferences associated with lifestyle changes, we would expect there to be some difference in the impact that each group is able to exert on taxes and tax setting behavior of policy makers.
From Orzechowski and Walker (1999) we were able to gather information on state level taxes on cigarettes over the entire period. This tax is the real (expressed in 1983 dollars) annual per-pack state level cigarette tax rate. This will be the dependent variable in our examination.
As mentioned earlier, one of the unique features of this paper is the data we were able to gather on state level per capita giving made to the American Cancer Society (ACS), expressed in real terms. We classify giving as state level monies raised solely through fundraising.
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State level giving to anti-tobacco organizations such as ACS could serve as a proxy for voter sentiment towards tobacco products. To that end, we would expect that those states with higher levels of giving to ACS should also have higher tobacco tax rates.
7 Figure 1 shows trends of giving for states with low, moderate, and high levels of ACS giving.
From the Department of Agriculture we were able to obtain data on the annual tonnage of tobacco grown in a state over the sample period. The amount of tobacco grown in a state should significantly affect the tax rates present. The presence of tobacco 6 Investment income and other sources were excluded. Giving is purely from donors. Donors include individuals, corporations, and foundations. Giving can come from wills, annuities, trusts, and other planned gift vehicles. This total also includes income from fundraisers. 7 We also acknowledge that we do not account for voter behavior here. Voters may give more to ACS because they use tobacco products but at the same time be generally opposed to higher tobacco tax rates.
industry lobbyist in states that produce significant amounts of tobacco should lead to lower tax levels in those states. 8 We gathered data on the real per capita incomes of residents in each state over the sample period. Ceteris paribus, higher income levels lead to higher tax rates, at least as they relate to income taxes. Given this, we would expect that states with higher per capita income levels will also have higher tobacco tax rates.
To incorporate a measure of fiscal constraint, we include a variable that measures the per capita level of surplus or deficit that a given state had. If a state has a fiscal constraint caused by a deficit, administrators could see tobacco tax revenue as a source of income to offset shortfalls. Of the 900 observations in the data set, deficits were present in 41 (4.5%) observations. Therefore, even if this variable were significant, we would not expect it to have a large effect on tobacco taxes. We also include a categorical dummy variable that is coded 1 in a gubernatorial election year.
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It is coded zero otherwise.
Political theory suggests that tax cuts are common during election years to garner political support. This variable should have a negative effect on tobacco tax rates, if any.
Finally, we include a categorical dummy variable that is coded 1 if the state was a member of the Project ASSIST program. It is zero otherwise.
RESULTS
As stated earlier, our intent is to examine the impact that these non-revenue maximizing programs had on state level tobacco tax rates. Per capita surpluses were not expected to have a large effect.
The fact that ACS giving was positive and highly insignificant is rather surprising. Bennett and DiLorenzo (1998) posit that donations made to ACS are used in lobbying efforts at both the state and federal level. If this is the case, we would expect that if these lobbying efforts were successful, states that had higher levels of ACS giving would also have higher tax rates. In addition, if ACS giving serves as a proxy for resident sentiment toward tobacco products, then states with higher levels of ACS giving would have higher tax levels. Our results do not support either of these positions.
Some state control instruments of interest that did have statistically significant coefficients include the percentage of metropolitan population, per capita income, and the measure of political conservatism. The signs of the coefficients were consistent with our a priori assumptions. The statistically significant negative relationship between political conservatism (ACU) and taxes would suggest that along with revenue maximizing behavior, to some extent, state tax rates reflect the political mood of its residents.
Project ASSIST
As was mentioned previously, this paper also examines the impact of a federally sponsored program designed to curtail smoking. There has been an extensive literature written on the effectiveness of taxes in decreasing the demand for tobacco products. This paper adds to the existing literature in examining the effectiveness of ASSIST in raising tobacco taxes in those states that participated in the program. Hu et al. (1995) examine demand responsiveness of tobacco products to increases in taxes as opposed to media campaigns aimed at reducing tobacco consumption. They find that tobacco consumption is reduced by a greater percentage through taxes than through a media campaign. Given this, it will be interesting to see what effect, if any, ASSIST has on state level tax rates and indirectly on consumption, which was the stated objective of the program.
Column 2 of Table 2 begins this analysis of ASSIST by adding a categorical dummy variable to the specification of Column 1. This specification reveals that being an ASSIST state did have a positive and slightly significant effect on tax rates in those states that participated. To further examine this, we include Table 3 which shows the results of a Chow test run on the specification of Column 1 of Table 2 . Table 3 reveals that by dividing the sample between ASSIST states and non-participating states, there is a fundamental difference occurring between those states that were in the program and those that were not. There was no significant change in the sign or significance of the coefficient of any other variable in this specification.
To further investigate the impact of ASSIST we highlight the results of Table 4 .
In Table 4 we split the entire sample into two sub-samples consisting of states that are tobacco producers and those that are not.
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A very interesting result is revealed from this analysis: Of the 17 states that participated in ASSIST, eight of them were tobacco producers. Column 1 of Table 4 reveals that the coefficient for ASSIST is negative and highly insignificant. On the other hand, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient for ASSIST is positive, large, and significant for non tobacco producing states.
The overall impact of ASSIST has been positive and slightly significant, as was shown in Table 2 . However, these results are a bit misleading. Table 4 shows that the impact of ASSIST is insignificant in tobacco producing states. The overall positive and significant results of ASSIST are driven by the positive, large, and significant impact of ASSIST in non-tobacco producing states.
The program's stated goal was to reduce consumption of tobacco in participating states. Since the grass roots efforts of participants allowed for variation in methods used, it is possible that ASSIST members in tobacco producing states concentrated their efforts in other directions, already conceding that an attempt to influence tax rates would be futile. Table 3 shows results of a Chow test for tobacco producers. Table 5 shows that an interaction term, which is the interaction of the tobacco variable with the ASSIST variable, has a negative and significant coefficient. This would imply that tobacco producing states which were shown to be ineffective in reducing taxes may have been effective on other margins, since those states did show an overall reduction in cigarette consumption.
As stated earlier, those states that participated in the ASSIST program were selected through a competitive bidding process. The final portion of the paper investigates the distinguishing characteristics of those states that participated in the program and those that did not.
To that end, Table 6 shows the results of a Probit analysis that was performed on the data. Table 6 allows us to examine whether any of the variables used in the analysis had a statistically significant impact on the probability of any given state being a participant in the program. Control variables with statistically significant positive impacts included the percentage of the state population in a metropolitan area, the amount of tobacco produced in a state and the amount of per capita giving to ACS. Negatively statistically significant controls included our measure of conservatism in the state and per capita incomes.
Although these results are informative, as discussed in Greene (1993), the coefficients can be difficult to interpret. Equation 2 allows us to determine that a given state has a 48.34% probability of being a member of the ASSIST program if we assume that x is the mean values of the data from Table 1 and β β β β is the estimated coefficients from Table 6 . .
These results show that, to some extent, non-fiscal factors have had some influence on state level cigarette tax setting behavior. Our proxy for resident sentiment (ACS) was shown to be positive in relation to taxes but highly insignificant. Our investigation of ASSIST yields mixed results. ASSIST has had a positive, large, and significant effect in non-tobacco producing states but has not been significant in tobacco producing states.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine the impact that two non-revenue maximizing programs had on state level cigarette tax rates over the period 1980 through 1997. We find that state level donations to the American Cancer Society had no statistically significant impact on taxes over this period. The results of our investigation were mixed in regard to project ASSIST. We found that in non-tobacco producing states, there was some impact on tax rates; however, this did not hold for participating states that were also tobacco producers.
The implications for policy are that efforts for future programs with an ASSIST framework might be most effective if aimed at states that do not produce tobacco. If the 12 The calculation here is
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